INTRODUCTION
Currently, the Internet architecture allows any node to inject IP packets into the network without requiring explicit permission from the intended receiver. This paradigm has served the Internet well. As Internet usage and applications have increased over the past decade, this simple architecture has also, however, enabled misuse of the network itself. Indeed, it has made denialof-service (DoS) attacks possible. Reports on network security threats published by Symantec [1] estimate an average of 6110 DoS attacks per day during the first six months of 2006.
Existing proposals on how to prevent DoS attacks can be classified in two ways. A reactive approach monitors network traffic. If an attack is detected, the system takes an action to prevent the attack. Filtering-based approaches [2, 3] fall into this category. A proactive approach sets up a set of rules that all data flows between a sender and a receiver have to follow. Data flows that violate the rules are simply dropped. Capabilitybased approaches [4] [5] [6] are examples of proactive approaches.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of a reactive approach is its ability to adapt its counterattack strategy dynamically as it monitors ongoing attacks. However, there are two disadvantages in a reactive approach. It is not always possible to differentiate legitimate packets from malicious packets, and by the time a reactive algorithm detects and acts against an attack, the attacker might have already accomplished his/her objective. In contrast, a proactive approach can prevent such an attack from taking place preemptively by setting up appropriate system rules. However, such an approach bears a risk of letting an attacker into the system if the attacker is able to circumvent the rules. For example, Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) [5] and Stateless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) [4] are vulnerable to attacks by compromised routers that can inject attack packets and drop legitimate packets. In addition, SIFF suffers from brute force attacks because it uses extremely short capabilities [5] . In addition, a proactive approach generates overhead to set up the rule and check whether flows follow its rule. For example, capability-based approaches have the overhead of setting up capability state and checking capabilities of flows. Neither a reactive nor proactive approach is effective against a compromised router.
We propose a new approach to prevent unauthorized traffic. Our approach, called Permission-Based Sending (PBS), is a hybrid of the proactive and reactive approaches, combining the benefits of both approaches and mitigating their disadvantages at the same time.
PBS uses explicit permission to give legitimate users the authority to send (proactive approach). The explicit permission allows differentiation of benign from malicious traffic, and can limit the severity of attacks. PBS uses a concept similar to that of existing capability-based systems in the manner in which the sender should get authorization (permission) from a receiver for flows. However, it not only adopts a capability-based approach, but also introduces a new and practical approach. Existing capabilitybased mechanisms are not practical. For example, TVA suffers from limitation of protocols because it does not work on UDP, and SIFF is not compatible with current IP networks because it requires modification of the IP header to
ABSTRACT
We propose a signaling architecture for network traffic authorization, called PermissionBased Sending (PBS), aiming to prevent DoS attacks and other forms of unauthorized traffic. Toward this goal, PBS takes a hybrid approach: a proactive approach of explicit permissions and a reactive approach of monitoring and countering attacks. PBS uses a concept similar to existing capability-based systems in the manner in which the sender should get authorization (permission) from a receiver for flows. However, PBS introduces new and practical approaches to overcome the deficiencies (the difficulty of obtaining permission and incompatibility with current network architecture) of those systems. On-path signaling enables easy installation and management of the permission state. Working on current network protocols supports compatibility and allows PBS to be deployed in existing networks. In addition, a monitoring mechanism provides a second line of defense against attacks. Our analysis and performance evaluation show that PBS is an effective and scalable solution to prevent several kinds of attacks, and improves the resilience of the system against network failure by using soft-state mechanisms. insert. To overcome these limitations, PBS uses a signaling mechanism that works on top of existing transportation protocols and security protocols.
PBS uses a monitoring mechanism to detect and react against attacks (reactive approach). The monitoring mechanism can provide a second line of defense against malicious traffic, which may have circumvented the permissionbased mechanism. Unlike PBS, capability-based systems that use a proactive approach have a risk of letting an attacker into the system if the attacker is able to circumvent the rules.
To implement our hybrid approach, we developed a secure and robust signaling architecture. In this architecture, the end hosts send signaling messages along the path of data flow in order to install permission states into the routers in the path. This is called on-path signaling. The signaling messages also contain information about traffic volume that can be used for network monitoring. To securely set up the permission state, signaling messages are protected end-to-end against alternation using digital signature. The channel security (TLS and DTLS) is used hop by hop for integrity and confidentiality of signaling messages. The soft-state mechanism of PBS supports the robustness against the state changes. Data packets use IPsec to authenticate the origin.
This article expands on our earlier work [7] by explaining the design goals of PBS and analyzing the processing delay of signaling messages and data packets , attacks handled by PBS, the permission granting process, and deployment and application of PBS.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We describe an overview of PBS, and provide the architecture and implementation details. We evaluate performance and compare the attacks handled by PBS to other capabilitybased mechanisms. Finally, we discuss deployment and application.
PBS OVERVIEW DESIGN GOAL
There are five design requirements for PBS: it must be deployable, distributed, robust, secure, and scalable.
PBS should work in the current Internet infrastructure without modifying core networks. For example, it should not modify IP headers or TCP/UDP packet headers. Thus, PBS uses signaling messages to set up and manage permission state, instead of piggybacking the permission information in the IP or TCP/UDP packet headers. PBS uses existing security protocols, such as IPsec, TLS, and digital signatures.
PBS should be a distributed system to eliminate the necessity of managing a central server. Thus, the permission should be granted by the receiver for a flow. The permission state is managed between the receiver and the sender along the data path by signaling. A subset of routers keeps state for a data flow, and monitors whether the flow is authorized.
PBS should be robust in the face of changes, such as routing and permission. Soft-state supports the robustness of the system. Thus, the permission state is periodically refreshed by signaling messages. If the state is not refreshed, the permission state is eliminated.
The permission setup and management should be secure. The signaling messages that install and modify the permission state and distribute cryptography keys should not be forgeable. Data packets must be protected against alteration.
PBS should be scalable to be applicable in high-speed and large-scale networks. PBS functionality does not need to be implemented in all routers. Thus, some of the routers that have PBS functionality should handle the authorization of data flows. In addition, the computational and signaling overhead should be small for scalability.
EXPLICIT PERMISSION USING SIGNALING
For permission state setup and management, PBS uses a suite of IP signaling protocols that have been developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) working group [8] . The reason that we use the NSIS protocol suite is that it supports some design requirements of PBS, such as on-path signaling, robustness against route changes, ability to work on the current networking architectures (including security protocols such as IPsec and TLS), and scalability. The NSIS protocol suite consists of two protocol layers on top of the transport layer: the NSIS Transport Layer Protocol (NTLP) and NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols (NSLPs) [9] .
The General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) [10] implements NTLP. The main purpose of GIST is to determine how to reach the next node along the data path (routing) and deliver signaling messages to the peer (transport). GIST provides on-path signaling by using underlying routing state information to deliver signaling messages along the data path. GIST is robust to route changes because it detects the route change and informs the NSLP layer about the changes (see [10] for more detail). GIST works on top of the existing transport layer protocols and reuses existing security protocols, so it does not require modification of current network protocols. According to Fu et al. [11] , who evaluated the performance of the GIST protocol, GIST supports scalability.
We developed a new NSLP, the PBS NSLP [12] . The NTLP (GIST) handles all incoming signaling messages and passes the PBS-related signaling messages to the PBS NSLP layer. There are two message types in the PBS NSLP: Query (Q) and Permission (P) messages. The Q message is sent by a sender to request permission (volume of data) to send data, specifying the volume of data. It contains the flow identification object, 5-tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol identifier), describing data flow. The P message is sent by the receiver who grants the permission to the sender along the reverse path of the Q message. The reverse path is set up by the GIST reverse routing state. The P message is used to set up (grant), remove (revoke), and modify permission state for a flow. The P message contains the flow identification, allowed volume in bytes, time limit for the permission, and refresh time for soft-state. The PBS nodes, which are routers and end hosts that have PBS functionality, store this information to keep track of permission states. between the adjacent PBS nodes. The Q and P messages are periodically transmitted to establish soft-state that enables the detection of permission state and security algorithm changes.
SECURITY OF MESSAGES
For secure permission state setup and management, PBS uses a public key cryptography mechanism for the authentication and integrity of signaling messages. Each sender and receiver generates a public/private key pair and a digital signature by encrypting the objects of signaling messages using its own private key (i.e., the sender encrypts the objects of the Q message, and the receiver encrypts the objects of the P message). Each public key in the form of the X.509 certificate, which is certified by a certificate authority, is distributed by a signaling message to the PBS nodes. The certificate is used to bind a public key and a user name (which includes the common name, an email address, and an IP address with extension). The Q message carries the sender's public key, and the P message carries the receiver's public key. To validate the authentication and integrity of the signaling messages, each PBS node decrypts the digital signature using the distributed public key. The sequence number of a signaling message is used to prevent replay attacks by incrementing the sequence number.
For the authentication and integrity of data packets, PBS uses the IPsec authentication header (AH). IPsec has been widely deployed for both IPv4 and IPv6, allowing PBS to work within current IP networks. The P message carries the shared key and security parameter index (SPI), which are generated by the receiver and will be used for IPsec. When each PBS node receives the P message, it stores the shared key and installs the security association (SA). For each flow, the SA has field values for destination IP address, IPsec protocol (AH or ESP), and SPI. To securely deliver the key and SPI value, channel security (TLS or DTLS) is used between adjacent PBS nodes. PBS functionality allows PBS routers to validate the IPsec header that uses transport mode between the two end hosts (sender and receiver) using the shared key.
For the authentication data field in IPsec AH, the sender uses symmetric key cryptography or public key cryptography. In symmetric key cryptography, the shared symmetric key that is delivered in the P message is used for encryption. The public key cryptography method entails using the sender's private key for encryption. The receiver has the right to choose a cryptography algorithm for IPsec based on the policy, network, and applications, and this notification is carried in the P message. Figure 1a shows the secure two-way handshakes for permission state setup and how PBS can prevent attack flows. Since the attacker does not have the shared key, the attack flow failed during IPsec verification. Figure 2 shows the permission state table, which is stored in PBS routers, for each flow.
MONITORING AND REACTION AGAINST DOS ATTACKS
Routers that do not have PBS functionality cannot generate bogus data packets because they do not have the shared key. A compromised PBS router that knows the shared key, however, can generate and insert attack packets when symmetric key cryptography is used in IPsec AH. Furthermore, an offpath attacker (i.e., external attacker) might obtain the shared key by controlling compromised PBS routers. Compromised routers, which may or may not be PBS routers, can drop legitimate packets. To prevent these attacks, PBS requires monitoring of network traffic and detecting attacks. The detection algorithm is called the PBS Detection Algorithm (PDA). PDA uses a soft-state mechanism of PBS, where a sender periodically sends a Q message that contains the volume of data it has sent after permission was granted. The receiver compares the volume of data in the signaling message with the volume of data that has been received. If they differ, the receiver suspects that there is an attack. Based on the detection, a receiver requests that the senders respond to the attack (using methods like changing the encryption algorithm or changing the path) using the indication in the P message. Figure 1b shows the basic operation of PDA. We assume that the receiver grants permission to the sender to send a flow of size 10 Mbytes. After setting up the permission state, the sender sends data packets whose total volume is 1 Mbyte. Since a compromised router has the shared key, it generates and sends attack packets whose total volume is 2 Mbytes with the correct IPsec header. After period T, the sender sends a Q message indicating that it has sent 1 Mbyte of data. The receiver can detect the attack by comparing the volume (1 Mbyte) in the Q message and total volume of data (3 Mbytes) that it has received. After the receiver detects the attack, it sends P messages with an indication to use public key cryptography to generate the authentication field of the IPsec header. After that, the attack packets are dropped at a router because of the IPsec verification failure.
PDA can detect packet dropping attacks by a compromised router. When a compromised router drops all or some data packets, the volume the receiver has received and the volume information in the Q message differ, so the receiver suspects that packets have been dropped and sends a P message indicating a request to change path. In addition, because of the retransmission scheme in NTLP (GIST) for the signaling message, we can say that the signaling message delivery is reliable, and the signaling messages must be delivered periodically. Thus, if there is signaling message loss, this means that there is a dropping attack. To react against these dropping attacks, the sender changes the path to avoid signaling message dropping. To change the path, the sender can use a relay node used for tunneling or path diversity by multihoming.
Data packet loss due to natural causes is also possible, and this is not an attack. Because of PDA, the natural packet loss might be regarded as a dropping attack. To avoid this, we apply a threshold-based decision scheme. If the difference between the amount of delivered packets and the volume information in the Q message is within a defined threshold, this is not regarded as a dropping attack. The threshold value can be defined by the receiver based on the network environment. PDA can also detect the heavy congestion link where there is significant packet loss, and it triggers the path changes. 
PBS ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
PBS has three components: on-path (path-coupled) signaling, authorization, and traffic management. We have implemented the components of PBS. Figure 3 shows our PBS implementation architecture.
ON-PATH SIGNALING
On-path signaling is used to install and manage permission state at the sender, routers, and receiver in a hop-by-hop fashion between routers that have PBS functionality. PBS NSLP and GIST are included in this component. We are building PBS NSLP on the GIST implementation by Fu et al. [13] . GIST implementation provides channel reliability (C-mode) and security (TLS). PBS NSLP parses and creates signaling messages at each node. More details about the signaling message format and PBS NSLP specification can be found in the Internet draft [12] . PBS NSLP parses and creates signaling messages at each node.
AUTHORIZATION
The authorization component decides whether to grant permission and timeout period for a flow. Another main objective of this component is to detect and identify attacks. Based on the detected and identified attack, this component decides what a sender should do to prevent the attacks, such as using public key cryptography 
Figure 1. Basic operation of PBS -FID: flow identification; RV: the volume of data the sender requests

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
The traffic management component handles all incoming packets, including signaling messages and data packets. It passes signaling messages up to the on-path signaling component. Based on the permission state of a flow that is stored in routers aware of PBS functionality, the traffic manager screens the data packets to see whether they are authorized. An IP packet filter is used to filter unauthorized packets. The IPsec header is verified in this component. To see whether the flow exceeds the given permission, this component monitors the volume of the data flow it has received since the permission state was set up.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Since PBS is intended to be deployed in highspeed networks, we need to show the scalability of PBS because scalability is one of the design goals of PBS. We measured and analyzed the CPU usage, processing delays, signaling overhead, and memory overhead. Figure 4 shows the testbed setup for performance measurement. The machines are running Linux with kernel version 2.6.23, and have AMD Opteron 2.2 GHz CPUs and 2 Gbytes RAM each.
COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
We measure the CPU usage to handle signaling messages at a router. Since the sender generates only a few sessions at a time, the CPU usage of a sender is not a problem. Since the receiver can dynamically increase the number of servers based on the CPU usage using load balancing algorithms, the CPU usage of signaling messages for a receiver is not a problem. Thus, we mainly consider the router's CPU usage. Figure 5 shows the CPU usage of PBS signaling message handling. The CPU usages of the PBS NSLP layer with different transport layer protocols and security protocols are the same since the signaling message delivery and channel security are performed at the GIST layer, and the NSLP layer is for signaling message verification and parsing. However, CPU usage varies based on the transmission protocol and security protocol in the GIST layer. The CPU usage is lowest when UDP is used and highest when TLS is used. Even though TLS is used for the delivery of Q and P messages, the router can handle 600 Q and 600 P messages per second. It means that if the period of soft-state in PBS NSLP is 60 s (short stream flows whose lifetime is less than 60 s get one-time permission), the router can handle 36,000 sessions concurrently.
Lee et al. [14] measured the network flows at the edge routers of the University of Auckland in 2006. They show the average flow departure rate and lifetime of flows. By using their data and Little's law, and assuming that arrival rate and departure rate are the same, we can get the average number of concurrent flows, which is 10,000 flows, and the maximum number of concurrent flows, which is 20,000 flows. Thus, PBS can be applied to the edge router. If we test the CPU usage at a router with a faster CPU and a higher memory size, the CPU usage can be lower, and the router can handle more signaling messages.
PROCESSING DELAY
We focus on the processing delay, which depends on the PBS functionality, including cryptographic algorithms. Since signaling messages have the authentication field generated by the public key, the verification of the authentication at a router increases the processing delay. Table 1 shows the processing delay of Q and P messages at a router. RSA-1024 has the smallest processing delay. We compared the IPsec processing delay based on the cryptographic algorithms, and compared the IP packet forwarding delay with and without a user space IPsec module. Table 1 shows the IPsec processing delay at a router. NULL means that there is no encryption for the IPsec AH authentication field, but the packets go through the user space IPsec module. Due to the high delay of public key cryptography algorithms, they are not suitable for delay-sensitive applications such as voice over IP (VoIP). The algorithms should be used only for highly secure and non-delay-sensitive applications.
SIGNALING OVERHEAD
The signaling message overhead can be determined by the size of a signaling message and the frequency of messages. There are two kinds of signaling messages: NTLP (GIST) and PBS NSLP messages. Fu et al. measured the GIST handshake signaling messages [10] , so we focus on the PBS NSLP signaling messages.
The size of PBS signaling messages depends on the X.509 certificate size the signaling messages carry and the symmetric key size the P messages carry. When the public key algorithm is RSA-1024, DSA-1024, and ECC-192, the Q message size is 1153, 1252, and 917 bytes, respectively and the P message size is 1189, 1292, and 957 bytes, respectively. The three algorithms have the same security level (80-bit).
We assume that the permission state is set up for a flow of streaming video using UDP. The size of the flow is 4 Gbytes, and the running time of the flow is 90 min. Thus, the permission state lasts for 90 min. We assume that the softstate periods of PBS NSLP and GIST are 60 s. When the public key algorithm is RSA-1024, DSA-1024, and ECC-192, the bandwidth usage 
MEMORY OVERHEAD
Since PBS is based on permission state, there is a memory usage overhead for storing permission state and session key for each flow.
Session key: The memory size for storing session keys depends on the key size and concurrent number of sessions. If there are 10,000 concurrent sessions, session key storage requires 0.2 Mbytes for HMAC-SHA1 and 1.28 Mbytes for RSA-1024.
State table: A router stores a permission state and IPsec state for each flow. The state is managed by hash tables. If we assume that each flow requires 100 bytes for storing the state, it only requires 1 Mbytes for 10,000 concurrent sessions. Therefore, memory usage for PBS is not a problem.
ANALYSIS OF PBS ATTACKS HANDLED BY PBS
There are two kinds of DoS attacks: on-path and off-path. An on-path attack is one where an attacker is in the data path. For example, a compromised router is an on-path attacker. An offpath attack is one where an attacker inserts attack packets into the data path, but is not on the data path itself. The attacker either spoofs the source address or uses its own address.
We categorize networks into two types: trustworthy networks and Byzantine. In the trustworthy network, we need only consider attacks from end users, and routers are not compromised. In the Byzantine network, we trust neither the sender nor the routers.
Trustworthy networks: Since the network is trustworthy, routers are not compromised. Thus, there is no on-path attack. Existing capabilitybased mechanisms [4, 5] suffer from the spoofing attack in the same subnet. When an off-path attacker spoofs a legitimate sender's address in the same subnet and obtains the capabilities through eavesdropping, the attacker can inject attack packets using the capabilities. However, PBS can prevent this attack because the authentication of a sender is protected by the security mechanism of PBS, IPsec. Because the network is assumed to be trustworthy, a symmetric key cryptography algorithm for IPsec is a good solution for this attack.
Byzantine networks: In Byzantine networks, off-path attacks can be detected by PDA. If the attacker does not spoof the packet source address, the attack packets are dropped at a router by checking the permission. If the attacker spoofs the source address, PDA detects the attack, and IPsec for data packet can prevent the attack.
Unlike trustworthy networks, in Byzantine networks, routers can be compromised. Existing capability-based mechanisms [4, 5] can be compromised by on-path attackers. The compromised routers that have the capability can announce it to upstream nodes, so these upstream nodes can use it. In addition, the compromised routers can use the capability to generate and inject attack flows, and can also drop legitimate packets. However, PBS can detect the packet injection and dropping, as described earlier. Since the compromised router has a session key, IPsec using symmetric key cryptography cannot prevent the attack. Thus, public key cryptography should be applied for the authentication field of IPsec AH. To avoid a compromised router that drops legitimate packets, the data flow path needs to be changed. To change the data path, a relay node used for tunneling or path diversity through multihoming can be used. ) PDA can detect all attacks except for a replacement attack because PDA is based on comparing the volume of data. In the packet replacement attack, the attacker does not generate or drop the packets, but changes the content of the packet. Thus, this attack cannot be detected by PDA. One solution to prevent this attack is to encrypt messages using a public key cryptographic algorithm. However, this requires computational overhead. Therefore, this message security should be applied minimally. However, if the network system requires high-end security (e.g., a military system), the message security to every message is required even though the computational overhead is high.
PERMISSION GRANTING PROCESS
PBS is based on deny-by-default, so any types of unauthorized traffic will not get permission to send, including DoS attacks, spam messages, and spam over Internet telephony (SPIT) calls. The permission granting process depends on the policy of the receiver. For example, if a receiver is a web server, it will only grant the size of HTTP requests to senders. This restriction of the amount of traffic to send will prevent botnet computers from injecting a large amount of traffic to the server.
In PBS, we assume that the receiver has a white list and a black list. A sender on a white list can get permission, but a sender on a black list cannot get permission from the receiver. However, even when a sender is on a white list, there are some cases where attacks happen. For example, compromised routers and end hosts can inject bogus traffic by spoofing the IP address of the sender in the white list. As described earlier, PBS can prevent these kinds of attacks. This white and black listing has an introduction problem. The introduction problem is deciding whether the receiver gives permission to a sender who is not on either of the lists. In the current PBS system, we assume that an anonymous user will get limited permission until the receiver believes that the user is not an attacker.
FAIRNESS FOR REQUESTING PERMISSION
An attacker can send a lot of signaling messages to make the PBS router incur computational overhead to validate them. To resolve this problem, PBS can use existing mechanisms, such as Portcullis [6] , which uses a puzzle-based mechanism for per-computation fairness. Since a sender has to spend its CPU time to solve a puzzle before requesting capability, the Portcullis system can provide fairness.
ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ROUTE CHANGES
Route changes, which occur through router failure, link failure, or router restart, are unpredictable in real network environments and decrease the performance of systems. The existing capability-based systems are based on the hard state protocol in that explicit communication terminates the state when failures are detected. However, as Lui et al. [15] demonstrated, softstate mechanisms outperform hard-state mechanisms in reality when network conditions are unpredictable. In PBS, the soft-state of GIST can detect the route change and inform the PBS NSLP about the changes, so the flow session can be set up at the new router. Furthermore, the soft-state of PBS NSLP messages is used to detect 
DEPLOYMENT AND APPLICATION
To effectively prevent attacks, at least one PBS router should be placed between the attacker and the receiver. If a receiver-side edge router has PBS functionality, the edge router can properly handle the attacks even though the attack packets are generated in the backbone area. If a sender-side edge router has PBS functionality, attacks from the sender side can be prevented near the attacker. Thus, installing the PBS functionality at the edge router can effectively prevent attacks that are generated in the middle of the path. However, the current PBS system is unable to handle the case where the receiver-side edge router is compromised. If the compromised edge router starts sending attack packets, these would reach the receiver. PBS is based on deny-by-default. Thus, in the case when all end users are supposed to have PBS functionality, the packets that do not have permission will be dropped at the router. However, for short stream flows, such as DNS and ICMP, the cost in terms of flow state setup delay and signaling message overhead is high. Thus, PBS is not applicable to these short stream flows. The short stream flows can be rate-limited, and the rate-limiting can reduce the effect of attacks by flooding the short streaming data.
In the case when some end users do not have PBS functionality, the packets that do not have PBS functionality will be rate-limited. Therefore, those packets without permission will be treated as short stream flows.
CONCLUSION
We have developed PBS, a signaling architecture for network traffic authorization. PBS supports secure permission state setup and management as well as robustness against route changes. PBS works on the current networking architecture using existing transport protocols (UDP or TCP) and security protocols (public key cryptography, TLS/DTLS, IPsec).
Our analysis shows that the PBS detection algorithm (PDA) can efficiently detect various kinds of attacks regardless of network type. Based on the detected and identified attacks, PBS suggests solutions such as using a stronger cryptography algorithm for IPsec or changing the data path to senders that are affected by the attack. Our performance evaluation shows that PBS scales well. 
